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movement of the 1950s" (110). Indeed, the Morris family saga is in-
structive for scholarship that is now focusing on the African American
experience in Iowa prior to the civil rights years of the 1950s and 1960s.
Although insightful, Morris's work raises more intriguing questions
than it resolves. What did the legacy of tradition and valor mean for
Morris family members and African Americans living in Des Moines
during the First and Second World Wars? What kinds of lessons did
the family legacy provide for James Brad Jr.'s offspring and black Des
Moines residents during the Korean and Vietnam War years of the
1950s and 1960s? And how did the political struggles waged by black
women famüy members, such as Morris's grandmother and great-
grandmother, shape the wartime experiences of their loved ones in
uniform during the periods in question? These are minor quibbles,
however. Future researchers of African American Hfe in Iowa in the
first half of the twentieth century will benefit from Tradition and Valor.
A World of Hope, A World of Pear: Henry A. Wallace, Reinhold Niebuhr, and
American Liberalism, by Mark L. Kleinman. Columbus: Ohio State Uni-
versity Press, 2000. ix, 370 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $55,00 cloth.
Reviewer Frank A, Warren is professor of history at Queens College, City
University of New York, He is the author of Noble Abstractions: American Lib-
eral Intellectuals and World War II (1999),
In A World of Hope, A World of Fear, Mark L. Kleinman uses Heruy A.
Wallace and Reinhold Niebuhr as key figures in offering altemative
paths for American foreign policy in the postwar period. He situates
their early domestic and foreign poUcy outlooks in their youthful ex-
perience. He shows how Wallace's rural Iowa background shaped his
social thought, and how Niebuhr's self-doubt about his choice of the
ministry and his concem for his German-American roots contributed
to his early speculations on society. Kleinman's focus on their societal
roots lays the foundation for one of his basic arguments: Wallace, the
original "insider," winds up by the late forties as the "cultural out-
sider." On the other hand, while Niebuhr, the original outsider, con-
tinued "to experience himself on the outside looking in," his "realistic"
perspective and political positions integrated him into the "inside"
culture of cold war America.
Kleinman's attention to the early careers of both men is one of the
strengths of the book, particularly in rescuing Wallace from one-
dimensional portraits. He is able to demonstrate the different dimen-
sions of Wallace: the man who was rooted in the rural traditions of
independence and self-help; the scientific, technological, agricultural
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geneticist; and the spiritual searcher whose interests led him to explore
"Hinduism, Bahaism, astrology, and Native American religion" (14).
According to Kleinman, it was his experimental approach that united
these interests. This material on Wallace's early career should be of
particular interest to Iowa readers who are interested in tracing
Wallace's development from an important local and regional figure to
a national political leader.
Although Kleinman disclaims attempting to "beatify Wallace" (13),
it is clear that his sjonpathies lie with Wallace. One of his main points
is that the attacks on Wallace for being a Soviet apologist stifled for-
eign policy debates. The conceptually "constrained" consensus that
developed among Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conserva-
tives, led, he writes, "not all that indirectly" (xii) to McCarthyism, Ko-
rea, and Vietnam. The impact on Niebuhr of the appeasement at Mu-
nich, the subsequent "Munichizing" of all later international conflicts,
and the threats of these to open, self-critical "public discourse" (301)
alarm Kleinman.
Having written critically of the cold war consensus myself and
having located its origins in the sput between Wallace and Üie Union
for Democratic Action, I find it hard to argue with the main outUnes of
Kleinman's position. However, as much as I admire his thoughtful-
ness, I think his particular formulation of the argument leaves out
Wallace's own role in closing the debate. Kleiriman is correct that some
of the attacks on Wallace as a Soviet apologist were unfair. Wallace was
not a fellow traveler, as was then charged. But his genuine desire for a
peaceful and cooperative postwar world led him to place Soviet ac-
tions in a benign light. Repeatedly using "security" as a justification
for Soviet actions in the period between 1946 and 1948, Wallace made
statements on the Soviet Union that were, to say the least, morally
obtuse. On occasion, Kleinman concedes the simplistic nature of
Wallace's view of the world. But Wallace's statements on the Czech
coup, for example, were more than simplistic; they were wrong and
damaging to the democratic values he proclaimed.
Thus, while Kleinnian is correct that Niebuhr helped shape a cold
war consensus that muffled serious foreign policy debate, he fails to
acknowledge Wallace's role. As long as the option was a liberalism
that failed to understand Stalinism, the field was left to the conserva-
tives and cold war liberals who excused all U.S. actions on the
grounds of anticommunism. Only a popularly supported "third
camp" condemnation of both imperialist powers could have broken
the cold war consensus and the Wallace alternative which fed into the
hands of that consensus.
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Kleinman's analysis is both perceptive and lacking on other issues.
His analysis of how the Union for Democratic Action (UDA) sought to
play the insider game in politics is correct. However, he is wrong
when he accepts Üie description of it as "a prototypical, 'liberal, anti-
Communist organization'" (135). Founded at the time of the Nazi-
Soviet Pact, it reflected the strong anticommunism of that period dur-
ing its first year. But during the war, anticommunism was largely ir-
relevant. Freda Kirchwey, Bruce Bliven, Max Lemer, and others who
were closer to BCleinman's definition of popular front liberalism were
leading lights in the UDA. And much of Niebuhr's foreign policy
writing in the war years sought to alert liberals to the security needs of
the Soviet Union.
There is much to admire in Wallace. His 1943 Detroit speech fol-
lowing the race riots stood out as an eloquent challenge to the coun-
try's racism, as did his courageous integrated tour through the South
during the 1948 campaign. His idea of combining local decentraliza-
tion with national centralized actions remains potentially fruitful. But
it was never developed because in the last analysis Wallace was, as
Dwight Macdonald saw, a fuzzy thinker. He wrote critically of capital-
ism, yet praised free enterprise and Horatio Alger. He supported a
policy of spheres of influence, yet denied that he did. He saw intema-
tional free trade as a key to peace, yet defended Stalinist policies that
opposed free trade. In 1948 he could not find any part of American
foreign policy to agree with, yet four years later he embraced the Ko-
rean War. His progression from the Progressive Party in 1948 to sup-
.port for Eisenhower in 1956 and friendly chats with Nixon in 1960 is a
jump that requires recognizing the abstractness and fuzziness of much
of his thinking. Well-intentioned in motive, restless in his secular and
spiritual inquiries, Wallace was a seriously flawed thinker and politi-
cal leader who, I believe, should not be held up as a useful altemative
to Niebuhr's cold war liberalism. Kleinman has made a strong case for
how the latter led to a "profound impoverishment of American politi-
cal culture" (xiv). Insofar as he holds out Wallace and his supporters as
a viable altemative, he makes as good a case as one can. That he fails
to persuade me does not detract from the importance of the book.

